We analyze the design of the optimal price for a firm which is a monopolist at home but competes abroad against foreign firms. The price rule depends on whethere there are economies or diseconomies of scope between home and foreign output and on the relative weights the regulator assigns to foreign-and home-earned profits. Informational asymmetry introduces a distortion in the price rule, which may be amplified by the existence of a competitive foreign market. Allowing the firm to compete abroad does not necessarily harm domestic consumers, and the price distortion is typically amplified as the number of competitors increases, so that the firm may also gain by stronger foreign competition.
Introduction
In more and more industries traditionally considered as "natural monopolies" we observe a continuing trend towards the introduction of competition in at least one segment of the business.
Electricity generation and supply represent a clear example of segments which are open to competition at least in many countries, and the same holds for gas and telecommunications. In railway transport the separation between the tracks (regulated monopolies) and the trains (competitive segment) is by now standard in the EU. However, vertical integration between firms operating in monopolistic and competitive sectors remains a common feature of many markets. EdF in France, most German energy utilities (e.g., RWE), the Italian train monopolist (Ferrovie dello Stato) are only few of the many existing examples.
Moreover, we have cases in which a firm acts as regulated monopolist within a country but has to compete in foreign markets. EdF, Enel and RWE are important examples of this type in energy markets, the Dutch firm TPG Post (integrated with TNT, which competes in courier services in several European countries) provides another example in the postal service. These instances are often the consequence of the process of deregulation spreading almost all over the world but that took place at different paces in national economies.
This situation raises novel issues, in that it can be argued that home regulation should also take into account what the home firm does outside national boundaries. Indeed, when there are technical spillovers (i.e. when costs at home and abroad are not independent), inducing the home firm to produce a large output level might either help or hinder its activities abroad, affecting the profit it can obtain there. In the same way, the presence of the foreign market may be used by the regulated firm to increase its rents, possibly affecting the regulated price and home consumers as well.
In this paper we want to tackle this issue in the hidden characteristic set-up by Baron and Myerson (1982) (BM hereafter) in order to determine optimal regulatory schemes when the regulated firm competes abroad. We show how the optimal price scheme relates to the original BM case and how the existence of a competitive sector affects optimal regulated price. In particular, we show that allowing the regulated firm to compete abroad does not necessarily harm domestic consumers, and we also show under what conditions this may be the case.
The price rule and the price distortion due to asymmetric information depend on the sign of the technological relationship between home output and foreign output and on the relative weights the regulator assigns to foreign-and home-earned profits. With full information and with economies of scope, the regulator should set a price below marginal cost, in order to help the firm in the foreign market, and vice-versa with diseconomies of scope. Informational asymmetry introduces a distortion in the price rule, which is amplified by the existence of a competitive foreign market.
However, we also discuss why the firm's activities in an unregulated market need not negatively affect home consumers in the regulated sector.
The distortion in optimal prices due to asymmetric information increases with the number of foreign competitors so that, unexpectedly, the firm may gain from stronger foreign competition.
However, the overall effect of increasing the number of foreign competitors on consumers' welfare in the regulated market is ambiguous.
With diseconomies of scope, we show that foreign unregulated activities reduce the regulator's ability to screen the firm's level of efficiency. Finally, independently of the relationship between production for the domestic and the foreign market, the asymmetric information distortion on the regulated price is shown to increase (decrease) with the weight the regulator assigns to foreign (domestic) profits in the welfare function.
This issue has not so far been considered by the existing literature on regulation (see Armstrong et al. (1996) for an excellent survey), which indicates how optimal price should be above marginal cost. The wedge between price and marginal cost is due a trade-off between production efficiency (the firm has some private information on production) and allocative efficiency (profits are given lower weights in the social welfare function). One limitation of this literature -that we try to relax -is that the firm is assumed to produce only one output (in the regulated market). Some papers have been developed on the relationship between regulation and competition, but they consider either the effects of regulated (access) prices on competition (among others, De Fraja, 1999), or the way competition in vertically related (e.g., input) markets can help regulation (see Vickers, 1995 , and Helm and Jenkinson, 1997). Calzolari (2004) deals with a multinational firm serving two countries and being regulated by two national authorities. We complement on this paper by allowing de-regulation in the foreign country.
A second stream of literature 1 that is relevant to our analysis is the one on strategic trade policies (e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1985) . One basic finding of this literature is that with Cournot competition, the home firm should be subsidized. With respect to this strand of literature we will show the interplay between regulation with asymmetric information in the domestic market and the presence of a foreign market with competitors. In our model the domestic regulator faces a trade-off between reducing firm's rent (which requires smaller home production or higher prices) and increasing the foreign profits of the domestic firm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the model, providing a full information benchmark and stressing features of the equilibrium in the foreign market. The basic set-up is 1 An important link between the regulation literature and the international trade one is the literature on the regulation of multinational firms. On this point see Bond and Gresik (1996) and Calzolari (2001) . Olsen and Osmundsen (2003) look at a somehow similar problem within an agency model. then developed in section 3 in the case of economies of scope. Section 4 turns to the case where diseconomies of scope characterize the cost function. Section 5 concludes the paper. All omitted proof are in the Appendix.
Model setup
A multinational enterprise (MNE hereafter) serves two countries. In country h (home) the firm is a regulated monopolist and in country f (foreign) it competes against other firms. The multinational produces outputs y h , y f respectively for market h and f so that total output in the two markets is Y h = y h and Y f = y f + Y _f where Y _f is output produced by the firm's competitors in country f.
The (inverse) demand in market i is p i (Y i ) and the two markets are separated. Although some of our results do not depend on specific demand formulations, for the sake of simplicity we will assume linear demand functions p i (Y i ) = a − bY i . The MNE's total production cost is C (y h , y f ; θ) = θ(y h + y f ) + λy h y f . Producing in one country decreases the marginal cost in the other country, i.e. if ∂ 2 C ∂y h ∂y f = λ ≤ 0 the firm benefits from economies of scope. We will focus mainly on economies of scope which is probably the most relevant case from an empirical viewpoint, but we will analyze the case with scope diseconomies -which also raises interesting theoretical issues -in section 4. 2 The parameter θ is an inverse efficiency measure of the firm: the smaller θ the more efficient is the firm, C θ > 0, C θy i ≥ 0 (subscripts indicate partial derivatives) with i = h, f. Moreover, θ is MNE's private information and the home regulator only knows that θ is distributed according to the cumulative distribution F (θ) and the density f (θ) > 0 over the support Θ = £ θ, θ ¤ and that f (.) satisfies the usual monotone
Economies (diseconomies) of scope can be seen as a consequence of increasing (decreasing) returns to scale in production of intermediate inputs that are used for the two final outputs. This also justifies the (marginal) effect that the adverse selection parameter θ has on both final outputs.
In the base model we will assume for simplicity that in the foreign market only two firms compete in quantities, the MNE and a foreign competitor producing y * f at cost C * = θ * y * f so that Y _f = y * f . We will then extend the model with considering n active firms in the foreign market.
The home regulator maximizes an utilitarian objective function which is a weighted sum of net consumer surplus, of the home firm's profit and taxes (or transfers). Let
denote gross consumer surplus in country h, then the welfare function maximized by the regulator is,
where α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 are the weight for the profits earned by the home firm respectively at home and abroad and T is the regulatory instrument (tax) employed by the regulator. In general, profits earned by the home firm in the home market Π h and abroad Π f need not be equally valued by the regulator. On the one hand, one could argue that high home profits are more valuable to a national authority because foreign profits cannot generate any tax income, and according to this argument one may want to assume α > β. On the other hand, if regulator's distributional concern imply α < 1 as in standard Baron and Myerson (1982) model, it would seem natural to set β = 1:
the national regulator should not be concerned about foreign customers and foreign rival firms.
However, if the justification for α < 1 is that a part of the firm's shares are in the hands of foreign shareholders, we should simply set β = α. Finally, it may well be that the regulator's mission does not entail any consideration of what the firm does abroad, in which case β should be equal to zero. We prefer to avoid a clear commitment on any one interpretation, and thus we postpone the discussion of these issues. For simplicity we assume that the shadow cost of public funds is zero. 3 MNE's total profit is
However, given that the cost function is non-separable in the two outputs, defining home and foreign profits can not be done in an unique way. We assume that the splitting rule the regulator has to employ is the following
where SAC (y h ; θ) = C (y h , 0; θ) is the stand-alone cost that the firm incurs in case it only produces for the home market and IC (y h , y f ; θ) = C (y h , y f ; θ) − C (y h , 0; θ) is the incremental cost the firm pays when producing for the foreign market as well. The profit obtained by the firm in the home market is the one the firm would gain producing only for the domestic market. On the contrary, the foreign profit is the extra-gain the firm can obtain expanding its activities in the foreign market.
Note that this profit partition is consistent in the sense that Π h + Π f = Π and has a long tradition in both the regulatory and accounting literature. 4 We will discuss its implication in the next section when dealing with MNE's participation decisions in the two markets. Following Baron and Myerson (1982) , the regulator sets a welfare maximizing regulatory instrument T (y h ) which is a non linear transfer function of the observable domestic production chosen by the MNE y h . We make the assumption that the regulator cannot condition the instrument on the firm's foreign activity. This can be justified on several grounds. First, regulatory powers are limited within domestic boundaries and regulator h can not directly influence consumption abroad.
Second, foreign production may well be difficult to observe. For the sake of concreteness, we also assume that consumer surplus in country h is sufficiently high so that the regulator always prefers to have the MNE producing.
The timing of the game is the following. The MNE privately learns its type. The regulator sets the welfare maximizing mechanism. The MNE decides in which countries to be active and its level of home production. Finally, at the last stage, regulation is enforced, competition in the foreign market takes place and payoffs realize.
Notice that the regulator is here a Stackelberg leader with respect to the foreign market activities. Therefore, the regulator cannot use the observation of foreign output to infer the value of θ. 5 This assumption is motivated by the existence of constraints in changing regulatory policies.
The fact that regulatory responses are in general substantially slower than industry changes is well documented. More specifically, the general principles of regulatory policies are usually dictated by norms, and even their application cannot be easily modified. For instance, the RP I −x system (the most common way to put into practice the notion of "incentive prices") envisages a price rule which remains fixed for a period of time from three to five years (Armstrong et al., 1997). Therefore, assuming that regulated prices represent longer term commitments relative to market determined prices seems quite natural in this set-up.
We assume that the MNE's competitors observe the regulatory contract and y h before playing the market game, so that we can model competition abroad as a game with symmetric information. 6 Finally, the MNE, its competitors and the regulator have common knowledge on the model setup.
Competition and full information regulation
Provided the regulated firm finds it profitable to be active in the foreign market as well, competition abroad leads to the following output levels for the MNE and its rival,
Note that as long as costs are non separable, equilibrium output levels in the foreign market depend on the domestic MNE's production y h and efficiency parameter θ. 7 Substituting for y f and y * f , the foreign profit of the MNE can be written as a function of the domestic output:
Notice that -in line with intuition -we have
Moreover, we can see that the cost function relevant at the regulation stage for output y h can now be written as
It is useful to point out that this function is now concave in y h . This is because ∂y f ∂y h ∝ −λ: an increase in y h induces a change in y f which is inversely proportional to λ so that, the marginal cost of y h is decreasing.
We can now turn to full information regulation. Absent informational issues, for any value of θ the regulator maximizes (1) with respect to y h subject to firm participation. The MNE's outside option is the profit level Π 0 f (θ) it can obtain in the foreign market with no domestic production.
Hence, that participation constraint the regulator has to fulfill is
equilibrium foreign profit when production at home is shut down (in this case foreign and total profits coincide). If this constraint were not met, the firm would be better off closing down its activities at home and possibly producing only for the foreign market. To make our analysis interesting, in the following we will assume that Π 0 f (θ) > 0 within the relevant range of parameters, i.e. that producing at home is not crucial to the survival of the MNE in the foreign market. More generally, we assume parameter values are such that equilibrium foreign outputs y f and y * f are positive, for any value of y h ≥ 0.
The solution to the regulator's program with full information requires the home price to be set in market h according to
(where the super-script F I stands for full information) which leads to the following home output and price
. In order to have sensible comparisons (both in the case of economies and diseconomies of scope), we employ the following Assumption The second order condition for the full information regulatory program is met, i.e.
The optimal regulated price with full information for a firm which operates only in the home market would be simply p F I (θ) = ∂SAC ∂y h = θ. Therefore, we can simply derive the following result.
Lemma 1
The presence of a foreign market affects the full information price introducing the following distortion,
with a)
Optimal pricing in the case of a MNE entails a departure from marginal cost pricing in that the regulator has the possibility to help the home firm to increase foreign profit. We do not maintain that this is the most effective instrument that a national authority may adopt to favour national firms in foreign markets, for tax rebates and production subsidies may be more effective.
Nevertheless, here we simply notice that due to linkages in MNE's production, home regulation "internalizes" the firm's foreign activities. Clearly with λ = 0 we have p F I h (θ) = p F I (θ), while due to economies of scope λ < 0 the optimal regulated price is below the "stand alone" marginal cost, θ. This is because
in (6) is positive. The firm will therefore be forced to increase home production and price below total marginal cost, in order to exploit scope economies and improve its ability to operate in the competitive market. This indicates that with economies of scope the defence of consumers' interest and the pursuit of firms' profits do not necessarily clash. Notice that this holds independently of the values of the distributional weights α and β (as long as they are between 0 and 1). 8 As for the comparative statics results, points a) and b) in Lemma 1 indicate that the differential between the weights of home and foreign profits in the welfare function increases equilibrium price with economies of scope. An increase in this difference should increase home price, and thus decrease production in the regulated sector, thereby decreasing the ability of the firm to compete against rival firms.
An increase in λ entails a reduction in the extent of the economies of scope: a high regulated output is less effective in decreasing the cost in the competitive market. In line with intuition, when economies of scope are less important the regulated price increases (and thus regulated output decreases).
Regulation with asymmetric information
When the regulator is uninformed about θ, she anticipates firm's activities in the unregulated market and sets the regulatory instrument T in order to maximize the welfare function and control firm's incentives. In the solution of the regulatory game we exploit the Revelation Principle. Thus, we will solve the game in which the regulator sets a menu of contracts {y h (θ), T (θ)} conditional on 8 Absent distributional concern the optimal price becomes p
where R f is the revenue the regulated firm can obtain in the competitive market and the regulated price will be lower than marginal cost. the firm's type and the firm announces its typeθ thus choosing the specific contract
Substituting output levels, the profit of a type-θ MNE which announces to be a typeθ becomes
The regulatory problem can then be written as follows
where
is the profit earned in market i when the firm truthfully announces its type and similarly for the total profit Π (θ). The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) is standard and assures that the firm prefers to report its type truthfully (θ = θ). The individual rationality (or participation) constraint (IR) has been previously discussed in the section on full information regulation. A remarkable fact is now that the outside option Π 0 f (θ) is type dependent. 9 Note that if the regulator did not explicitly consider unregulated activities when providing the firm with the incentives for truthful revelation, then she would not be able to induce the firm to reveal its true costs. In other words, imagine the regulator considers an incentive compatibility
Then, she would set a regulatory policy that does not induce truthful revelation, for the firm's decisions are also motivated by his activities in the unregulated market. By the Revelation Principle, such a regulation would then be suboptimal. Hence, even if the regulator did not care about unregulated activities in the social welfare function, i.e. if β = 0, still she would have to consider them in order to induce the firm to serve the regulated market (i.e. constraint (IR)) and to provide the right incentives.
The domestic gains for the firm (i.e. the gains the MNE obtains from producing abroad and at home as well) are
and constraint (IR) can be rewritten as
Following standard analysis (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992) and noticing that y f = y f ³ y h (θ) ; θá nd ∂Π ∂y f = 0 (for the envelope theorem), it can be shown that constraint (IC) is satisfied if and
and
With a firm uniquely acting in the home market, we would have
∂y h ∂θ = −1 so that the second order condition (11) would be simply a standard monotonicity conditionẏ h (θ) ≤ 0.
When the firm also operates in another market, instead, we have
In principle, then, the second order condition may be more complex than in the standard model of regulation, for
∂y h ∂θ may not be of constant sign. However, this does not create problems in the case of economies of scope. In fact, the first term can be rewritten as
9b λ ≤ 0 and the second order condition simply requires domestic output to be non-increasing in θ, i.e.ẏ h (θ) ≤ 0. 10 This allows us to obtain the following result, where AI stands for asymmetric information.
Proposition 1 (i)A necessary condition for optimal regulation with asymmetric information is
which leads to the following equilibrium price
(ii) The equilibrium profit of the least efficient firm (i.e. type θ) is equal to its foreign option Π 0 f ¡θ¢ , whilst more efficient firms obtain strictly larger profits equal to
As usual, with asymmetric information the regulator faces a trade off between allocative and distributive efficiency. Distributive efficiency requires to limit the firm's profit, which in turn positively depends on regulated output, so that the regulator is ready to reduce output and sacrifice allocative efficiency. The novelty in the previous proposition is the effect of the foreign unregulated market on regulated price, quantity and on the firm's profit. 10 Our functional forms further simplify the derivation of the standard single crossing condition. However, in a previous version of this paper we prove that with economies of scope
≤ 0 is always verified. The case of diseconomies of scope will be addressed in Section 4.
Beyond the (quite obvious) direct effect on costs, a more efficient firm produces a larger y h and then a larger y f because of economies of scope. This implies that the smaller θ, the larger
e. dG/dθ ≤ 0) and, as usual, if the individual rationality constraint is satisfied for θ, the same holds for all the other types. 11 Hence, the least efficient type θ obtains a rent equal to its outside option, that is the profit it can gain being active in the unregulated foreign market only. This indicates that -unlike standard models where the firm does not operate in unregulated sectors -here even the least efficient firm enjoys a positive rent and this is entirely due to the possibility to compete in the unregulated market. As usual, profits of more efficient firms are strictly larger than Π ¡ θ ¢ , as indicated in Proposition 1: the regulator has to grant larger profits to more efficient firms because of their informational advantage. Hence, these informational rents induce a distortion in the regulated price and output.
As for the effect of asymmetric information on the distortion in the optimal price, there are two types of analysis that we can perform. First, one can study how asymmetric information affects the optimal price. In this respect we need to compare the price with asymmetric information with that illustrated in the previous section with full information. Second, we will study how asymmetric information and firm's activities in the unregulated market interplay. To this end we will compare the asymmetric information distortion in Proposition 1 with the distortion induced by asymmetric information when the firm uniquely operates in the regulated market. We now analyze in detail the role played by asymmetric information on profit and prices. In so doing we will exploit the close link between the rents accruing to the firm and the distortion in optimal price.
The effect of asymmetric information The additional rents that firms more efficient than θ obtain are composed by two terms that depend on y h (see condition (14)). The first term,
∂SAC ∂θ
= y h , is standard in regulation with asymmetric information when the firm operates in a single market. A firm with type θ would have an incentive to behave as if it were a less efficient typeθ = θ + dθ obtaining larger profits. In fact, by so doing it chooses a regulatory contract ³ y h (θ), T (θ)´that has a second order effect as for the quantity to produce. However, by mimicking typeθ, the regulated firm obtains a transfer T (θ) that is designed to "reimburse" larger costs 
for
3 y f and ∂IC ∂θ = y f . As the firm also operates in the unregulated market, by mimicking a less efficient firm it can earn additional informational rents on foreign activities. In fact, a firm θ mimicking a less efficient typeθ = θ + dθ can obtain larger transfers that must compensate also for smaller profits in unregulated activities, as emerges from (15) . This relates to the larger direct costs of a firmθ in producing y f -measured by the term ∂IC ∂θ -as well as a smaller profitability through an increase in rival firms' output levels, as shown by
These two components of the firm's rent consequently affect the pricing condition as well. In the proof we show that the actual difference between optimal price with asymmetric information and full information price p AI h (θ) − p F I h (θ) in (13) consists of three terms:
The first effect -identified by the first term in square brackets -emerges because the regulator takes into account that a larger y h increases the firm's profit for
≥ 0 so that she tends to distort equilibrium output downwards. This explains the distortion
pricing condition (12) that would be absent if the regulator had full information on the firm's costs.
Second, with economies of scope a lager y h makes the firm more competitive in the unregulated market so that y f increases. A larger production in market f increases the absolute value of
which in turn generates a larger profit (see (14) ). This is why we have an additional distortion in the pricing condition (12) that is due to the interplay of asymmetric information and of the existence of foreign activities,
∂y f ∂y h and it is larger (in absolute terms) the larger the level of economies of scope, i.e. |λ| , and the less "elastic" foreign demand.
Finally, the third term in square brackets indicates that the regulator (in full information as well as with asymmetric information) would like to help the MNE in the foreign market by increasing y h relative to the case where the regulated firm only operates at home. The extent of this "distortion" depends on the knowledge the regulator has about the firm's cost, and it thus differs from the equivalent expression calculated with full information. Hence, given that the first two effects of asymmetric information bring about a smaller level of y h , this depresses firm's profits in the unregulated market and also
, thus inducing a further reduction of the optimal regulated quantity (and increase of the optimal price).
We summarize in the following Corollary the overall effect of asymmetric information on reg-ulated price.
Corollary 1
The overall asymmetric information distortion
Moreover, this distortion increases with β and decreases with α and λ.
All three terms in (16) are positive for any θ < θ, and hence asymmetric information leads to a larger regulated price. 12 Furthermore, even if the firm earns an informational rent both on regulated and unregulated activities, the trade off between distributive and allocative efficiency uniquely refers to the different weight that the regulator assigns to the consumer surplus and the firm's profit on the regulated home market, i.e. α. The informational rent paid to the firm out of home market's surplus is proportional to the output produced at home. This is why ∂D AI /∂α < 0: as standard (see Baron and Myerson, 1982 ) a higher weight of home profits induces a higher equilibrium output and hence a higher rent for the regulated firm.
The interpretation of the effect of β is less obvious. Notice that this parameter only intervenes in the third term in (16) . i.e. it affects regulated price only via the foreign profit term (1−α+β)
∂Π f ∂y h in the necessary condition (12) for optimal regulation. One should recall that when the firm obtains a larger profit abroad the regulator is able to reduce the rents that have to be paid to the MNE at home without violating the participation constraint. Therefore, there is an implicit trade off between home profits and foreign profits: reversing the above argument, we can thus see that a higher level of β will make domestic rents less desirable for the regulator, who will thus reduce domestic equilibrium output. In other terms, foreign profits and home profits are "equally good" in meeting the participation constraint, but the asymmetry between α and β introduces the regulator to prefer foreign profits. A larger value of β makes this effect stronger.
Finally, the informational distortion decreases with λ. To see why this should be the case, recall that large economies of scope increase the level of foreign production and we know by (15) that this raises the firm's profit. Hence, the regulator "reacts" with a smaller y h or a larger regulated price p h .
The presence of unregulated activities Let us now compare the equilibrium price p AI h (θ) in Proposition 1 with the one induced by asymmetric information when the firm uniquely operates in the regulated market. As it is well known, in the latter case, the necessary condition for optimal pricing is simply (as Baron and Myerson, 1982 )
that leads to an optimal price
The regulator is induced to distort the price with respect to the optimal full information price by
Hence, when the regulator is not fully informed, the overall effect of unregulated activities in the foreign country D ≡ p AI h (θ) − p BM (θ) can be rewritten as follows
Relative to the Baron-Myerson case, foreign competition introduces two changes. First, a change in the optimal full-information price, measured by the first term in (17) that we have discussed in Section 2.1 on full information. As already pointed out, absent informational problems, foreign competition should induce the regulator to decrease home price in order to let the firm benefit from economies of scope. Second, we have an additional informational distortion, measured by the second term in (17) that drives towards a price higher than in the case where the firm is only active in the regulated market.
As we show in the appendix, the price change induced by foreign activities with asymmetric
can be clearly decomposed into two countervailing terms:
where In general, the optimal price might be higher or lower than p BM , depending on which effect dominates. However, some interesting results can be obtained.
Corollary 2 .
(i) Allowing a regulated firm to operate in a foreign unregulated sector may either favor or harm home consumers.
(ii) If the regulator attaches a high weight to the firm's home profits (i.e. for α sufficiently large), then consumers in the regulated market benefit if the regulated firm extends its activity abroad.
(iii) Allowing a regulated firm to operate in a foreign unregulated sector increases the price distortion due to asymmetric information.
As we have discussed, the overall effect of unregulated activities on price and consumers' welfare These two countervailing effects make the overall effect of foreign activities ambiguous. However, abstracting from the effect of unregulated activities in the foreign market under full information, the Corollary shows that asymmetric information rises more the regulated price when the firm is active in the unregulated foreign market.
The intensity of competition Up to now we have assumed that in that market there are only two active firms, the firm that is also active in the regulated market and a competitor. Assume now that the total number of firms in the unregulated market f is n. The following Proposition shows the effect of a larger n on the regulated price both with full and asymmetric information.
Proposition 2 Let n be the number of rival firms in the unregulated sector. The full information price in the regulated market p F I h decreases with n (and so does the distortion D F I ≤ 0). On the contrary, the asymmetric information distortion D AI increases with n and the effect on D is ambiguous. The MNE's total profit Π may increase in n.
As one may expect, with economies of scale, the marginal profitability of home output in terms of profit obtained in the unregulated market decreases with the number of competitors,
i.e.
Hence, this explains that a more competitive foreign market will induce the fully informed regulator to decrease the price at home, for
expansion of the regulated activities by the firm partially contrasts the reduced profitability in the unregulated market market.
What is more interesting to note is the effect of stronger competition on the distortion generated by asymmetric information. By implying a larger regulated output, stronger competition in the unregulated market also determines larger informational rents on regulated activities and then larger distortions due to asymmetric information. An interesting consequence of these effects is that the overall profits of the regulated firm Π may well increase when the unregulated market becomes more competitive.
Diseconomies of Scope
The full information output (price) is non increasing (non decreasing) in the cost-inefficiency parameter θ, i.e. λ ≤ 9b 8 1 1−α+β . 13 In some case firm's activities may be characterized by diseconomies of scope so that larger production in one of the markets increases the marginal cost of production in the other market. As an example, this can be a consequence of internal production of intermediate inputs with decreasing returns to scale that are employed by the two units producing final outputs, or by the presence of 13 This also implies that y G. Calzolari and C. Scarpa non-reproducible assets or inputs that final producing units compete upon. Notice that we may well have diseconomies of scope associated with variable costs, and at the same time the firm may find it profitable to operate in both markets, if by so doing the firm can save on unit fixed costs (or possibly obtain better conditions by the regulator).
The presence of diseconomies of scope raises two main difficulties as for the procedure we have discussed in the previous section on optimal regulated price. First, with diseconomies of scope the
does not necessarily decrease with θ (the sign of ∂G/∂θ depends on both θ and y h ). Second, the sign of
∂y h ∂θ also depends on θ and y h . Indeed, from previous analysis we have
λ which with λ > 0 may be either positive or negative. Hence, in principle, the control of firm's rent in order to induce participation turns out to be a difficult task and so is the control of firm's incentives. However, as we will show, the simple model we are discussing allows one to perform a complete analysis of the case at hand.
For simplicity, to keep this part of the model manageable, we will assume the following:
However, our results can be generalized to any distribution with linear hazard rate, i.e.
14 In the following we will explicitly emphasize the results that uniquely require the linearity of the hazard rate.
Contrary to the case with economies of scope, here the larger the regulated output, the smaller 14 The linear hazard rate is a common assumption in applied adverse selection models and, in addition to the uniform distribution, it is verified by arbitrarily close approximations of any exponential distribution. Note that, a (generalized) monotone hazard rate. i.e. d the output produced by the firm in the unregulated sector and the larger the output of the competitor(s). This immediately implies that with full information the regulated price is set higher than that would emerge if the firm were not active in the unregulated market, i.e. p(y h ) > ∂SAC ∂y h . Moreover, the larger is α, the smaller is the (full information) distortion due to unregulated activities and the opposite holds for changes in the weight to profits β.
The regulatory problem with asymmetric information (P) is the one discussed in Section 3
where, depending on parameters value, it may happen that the net firm's profit
It may also happen that
∂y h ∂θ takes a positive sign so that the second order condition (11) requires that the regulated output increases in the inefficiency parameter θ, i.e.ẏ h (θ) ≥ 0. 15 This poses a problem, but the following Lemma provides a characterization of the admissible cases.
. not too strong diseconomies of scope) then
∂y h ∂θ ≤ 0 and dG/dθ ≤ 0; in this case regulated output is decreasing in θ.
(ii) Otherwise, if λ > (9/8) b, regulated output is non-decreasing in θ (i.e.ẏ h (θ) ≥ 0) and type-θ firm is the one obtaining the smallest profit (i.e. Π f (θ) = Π 0 f (θ)).
This Lemma shows that diseconomies of scope induce a reversal in firm's mimicking incentives, so that inefficient firms with higher values of θ find it interesting to mimic more efficient firms with lower values of θ. As usual, a larger θ negatively affects the marginal effect of y h on home profit, i.e.
However, we know that the overall effect of θ on total firm's profit also depends on a second term related to the unregulated market. With diseconomies of scope a larger regulated output has 15 More generally, sign {dG/dθ} and sign n With this result we can now characterize the optimal regulated price and the resulting firm's profits. (ii) With strong diseconomies of scope, i.e. λ > (9/8) b, the firm's profit is
and the optimal price is for any θ
This Proposition shows that as long as diseconomies of scope are not too strong, the optimal pricing rule and the resulting firm's profits are unchanged with respect to the case with economies of scope.
For larger diseconomies of scope, the asymmetric information distortion D AI in (13) decreases with λ and vanishes when λ exactly meets the value (9/8) b (see Corollary 1, which holds for any value of λ). Even if this happens for a specific values of λ, interestingly enough in this case the effect of unregulated activities is to eliminate any asymmetric information distortion.
For larger values of λ (i.e. λ > (9/8) b) the structure of the pricing rule and of profits are deeply affected by the firm's activities in the unregulated market. Diseconomies induce a reversal in the firm's mimicking incentives, so that inefficient firms with higher values of θ find it interesting to mimic more efficient firms with lower values of θ and the second order condition for implementability requires the regulated price to be non increasing in θ (see Lemma 2) .
The optimal price (and similarly quantity too) shows a discrete jump from
for any level of diseconomies of scope in the interval (9/8) b ≤ λ ≤ λ 0 . Interestingly then, in this case the optimal regulated price and output must induce pooling among all types in order to satisfy the second order condition and unregulated activities have a strong impact on regulation for the regulator cannot screen among types. Finally, for even larger λ (i.e. λ ≥ λ 0 ) screening is admissible and the optimal price is decreasing in θ. 16 The following Corollary summarizes all these effects and the comparative statics with respect to all the relevant parameters.
Corollary 3 With diseconomies of scope (i.e. λ > 0), the asymmetric information distortion, larger n) reduces the distortion D AI for λ ≤b/(1 − α + β) and increases it otherwise.
Contrary to economies of scope, with diseconomies of scope the full information distortion
showing that the full information price increases when the firm 16 The region 9/8b ≤ λ ≤ λ 0 is empty if α < β and a necessary condition for p F I h ¡ θ ¢ to be a pooling equilibrium is then α > β. In general, with a non uniform distribution λ 0 would depend on the value of d h
if pooling is optimal, it may be only partial. However, we still have that for sufficiently large λ the optimal price is the screening decreasing price.
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operates in the unregulated sector as well. As a consequence, the comparative statics is reversed with respect to economies of scope so that 
Conclusions
This paper has highlighted how the mere existence of a foreign market, where regulated firms compete with foreign rivals, modifies both full information optimal price and the informational distortion that emerges in Baron-Myerson type models. Several themes, however, remain open for future research.
For instance, one of them is the issue of incentives to invest. There is an extensive literature which -not without ambiguity -points out how competition might contribute to the internal efficiency of the firm. Analyzing how competitive pressure in "adjacent" markets drives the firms to exert greater effort, compensating the underinvestment problem pointed out by Laffont and Tirole (1986) represents an immediate potential extension of this line of research.
A second possibility would be to look at the relationship between regulation and competition when the regulated firms competes in a second domestic market (rather than abroad). Indeed, in many markets competition and regulation coexist, and their interplay is still largely unexplored.
This situation is at least as common as the problem we have studied, for example in the case of electricity (where vertically integrated firms are monopolists in distribution or in transmission, but compete in the generation market) or telecoms (where one typically observes a monopoly in the last mile while competition is extensive in other segments). In an ongoing research Calzolari and Scarpa (2004) address this issue and study whether a regulator should allow multi-utility firms to operate. In this case a relevant ingredient of the analysis seems to be the fact that the level of economies (or diseconomies of scope) can be firm's private information with respect to both the regulator and the firm's competitors.
By directly interacting with the integrated firm or MNE, the regulator may learn more information on the firm's cost efficiency than the firm's competitors. Hence, she may be able to control the level of information that is available to competitors in the unregulated market. This approach can be pursued along the lines of the recent developments on information disclosure in contractual relationships as in Calzolari and Pavan (2004) .
Several commentators have suggested that competitors of a dominant firm should be compensated with forms of asymmetric regulation. However, one could argue that a regulated price, set regulated market at the expense of consumers. An analysis of the relative merit of these arguments is a task that we leave to future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Straightforward calculations simply yield a)
Proof of Proposition 1. Following the well known first order approach (Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984) , instead of analyzing the original program (P) we study a relaxed program (P r ) in which we momentarily neglect constraint (11) . We will verify ex-post if the solution of (P r ) verify this constraint.
First we show that . We then obtain,
The relative magnitude of the values of y f in the two terms on the R.H.S. depends on whether
The last term is negative and the first two terms can be rewritten as
With economies of scope, (18) is always negative as y f (θ) ≥ y 0 f (θ). With diseconomies of scope, y f (θ) ≤ y 0 f (θ) and whenever y 0 f (θ) is not too large relative to y f (θ), i.e. when diseconomies are not too strong, by C θy i (·) > 0 we have (18) is negative. However, (18) can be rewritten as
3b y h so that (18) finally becomes (−3b + 2λ)
Hence, we have that
The net rent (9) is thus decreasing in θ and making constraint (IR) bind for type θ implies that constraint (IR) is satisfied for all types.
Now we transform the program focusing on Π h (θ; θ) as the relevant firm's rent. Constraint (IC r ) in program (P r ) can be rewritten as
Now substitute the definition (3) of Π h into the objective function and the relaxed program becomes
Integrating by parts the term
To maximize this expression w.r.t. y h we employ calculus of variations. First define
The Euler's equation can then be written as
Which, rearranging, becomes (12) . Given the sign of Π h ¡θ ;θ ¢ in the welfare function, the transfer will make constraint (IR) binding for typeθ.
Turning to check whether the second order conditionẏ h (θ) ≤ 0 is met, given the optimal pricing condition, this requires determining under what conditions
This rewrites as
Hence, the standard monotone hazard rate assumption
Finally, integrating 
that with simple substitutions leads to (14) .
educes to
Given that 9b − 8λ > 0 and S = 9b 2 − 8λ
Moreover, differentiating we have
∂α ≤ 0 for D AI is the product of two terms that are negatively affected by α,
that even if we have assumed identical demand functions in the two markets, the parameter b in D AI uniquely refers to the unregulated market demand.
Proof of Corollary 2. Simple calculations lead to
S+λ(1−α+β)(9b−8λ) bS i .
The definitions of the distortions are
Lemma 1 and with simple manipulations
The sign of D F I and D AI −D BM together with the previous expression for D immediately show the overall ambiguous effect of foreign activities on the regulated price. Note that In the full information case, it is easy to show that the optimal price can be written as with s(n) = (n + 2) 2 , r(n) = (n + 1) 2 . Moreover, the second order condition is 2λ 2 (1 − α + β)r(n)−b 2 s(n) < 0.
We then have
With asymmetric information, equilibrium domestic output and price then become (ii) As for the sign ofẏ h (θ) , simply recall that the second order condition for implementability (11) is The first term is positive for dp F I h (θ) /dθ ≥ 0 as well as the second term for λ ≤ (9/8) b.
Assume now λ > (9/8) b. From Lemma 2 we have that the second order condition for implementability requiresẏ h (θ) ≥ 0 and we also have dG/dθ > 0 so that it is optimal for the regulator that with simple substitutions leads to the profit in the Proposition.
Finally, we need to check the compatibility of the cases discussed in the Proposition with the condition of non increasing full information output. We know that Finally, one can show that there exist parameter values such that the region that we have individuated for λ are not empty (see note 4). This concludes the proof.
